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A question of considerable interest in assessmg long-term energy 
options involves whether burrung of carbon, particularly the plentiful 
resources of coal, will continue increasing. If so, the level of carbon diox- 
ide (CO ) in the atmosphere may rise substantially, perhaps doubhg 
around ?he middle of the next century. I t  is widely believed that such an 
increase would lead to a significantly different climate, probably one 
warmer than the earth has experienced for on the order of 100,000 years, 
and to important consequences for the economy and environment. 
What is the appropriate societal response to t b s  prospect? Should 
nations try to prevent or reduce such change? If they choose to accept 
the change, what adaptive measures may be effective? These questions 
have been under study for some years at  IIASA, first in the Energy Sys- 
tems Program (ENP) and more recently in the Resources and Environ- 
ment (REX) and Management and Technology (MMT) Areas. The REN Area 
is grateful to Dr.  Lave for preparing t h s  paper for h s  recent visit to the 
institute expanding the characterization of a policy of adaptation and how 
it might be successfully developed. Dr. Lave, a Senior Fellow in the 
Economic Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, has been deeply 
concerned with these questions through h s  participation in the climate 
project of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and 
the Carbon Dioxide Effects and Assessment Program of the US Depart- 
ment of Energy. 
Previous work at IIASA has explored strategies for prevention of car- 
bon dioxide emissions and for physical compensation for carbon dioxide 
once it has been created. A preventive strategy emphasizing economic 
tools was developed by Nordhaus. (See Nordhaus, W . ,  The Ejf ic ient  Use of 
Ene~gy Resources,  New Haven: Yale, 1979, and " M n g  About Carbon 
Dioxide: Theoretical and Empirical Aspects of Optimal Control Strategies," 
Workmg Paper, Yale University, July 1980.) Technical means tor compen- 
sation have been proposed by Marchetti. (See Marchetti, C., "Constructive 
Solutions to the C02 Problem," pp. 299-311 in Bach, W., J. Pankrath, and 
W. Kellogg (eds.) Man's Impact  on Climate,  Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1979.) 
Comparative discussion of arguments for the different societal responses 
is offered In t h s  paper, as well as by Meyer-Abich. (See Meyer-Abich, K. 
M.,  "Chalk on the Whte Wall? On the Transformation of Climatological 
Facts into Political Facts," in Ausubel, Jesse and Asit K. Biswas (eds.), 
C l i m t i c  Constraints and  H u m a n  Activities, OxPord: Pergamon Press, 
1980.) 
Current IIASA research on the C02 question is attempting to place 
the various policy options in a more systematic context, usmg a gaming 
approach. The status of t h s  work is described in Robinson J. and J. Ausu- 
bel. "A Fr-ework for Scenario Generation for C 0 2  Gaming," IIASA WP- 
8 1-34, 
Vast uncertainties surround our ability to pre&ct the physical and 
social effects of increased carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmo- 
sphere during the next century; fossil fuel combustion rates will change, 
predicting the effects of carbon &oxide on climate is difficult, and 
predicting the resulting social reactions to these changes is essentially 
impossible. Furthermore, time must elapse before there is convincing 
proof of the expected amount of climatic change, before people perceive 
the magnitude of the problem and accept its existence, before we can act 
to abate emissions, and before new capital can be put into place. In addi- 
tion, it wdl be extraordinarily difficult to convince all nations to abate 
carbon &oxide, .especially since some will gain from climatic changes. 
Thus, we must focus on adaptation to future climatic change, as it is a 
more feasible social response than reducing carbon dioxide emissions in 
order to prevent change. 
Unfortunately, the effects of carbon dioxide are likely to be insidious 
and difficult to connect to climahc change. Myriad effects, both good and 
bad, are U e l y  to be recognized as caused by carbon dioxide. 
Conscious adaptation involves explicit decisions or compulsion such 
as convincing people to change their behavior or punishing antisocial 
behavior through laws or fines. Unfortunately, such acbons cannot be 
tailored to achleve precise objectives; they are blunt tools that should be 
used only for important goals and then sparingly. Unconscious adapta- 
tion takes place through behavioral changes induced by the market place 
or social institutions. These mechanisms can be swift and powerful, but 
are difficult to manipulate. 
Monitoring climatic change and informing important groups of the 
current state of knowledge on carbon dioxide induced climatic changes 
can help to speed adaptation, as can contingency planning and develop- 
ment of nonfossil fuel technologies. More important are plans that would 
set unconscious adaptation into motion, such as plans to disseminate 
information on the problem and on behavior whch will help indviduals or 
firms. 
Of greatest importance is having a society that can quickly perceive 
and adapt to the new regime. Th.~s means a strong economy with u h  
scient~fic and engineering capabilities, a well educated population, and a 
more flexible, resilient capital stock. These social and economics charac- 
teristics are desirable from many points of view unrelated to carbon diox- 
ide. Thus, carbon dioxide can serve as a catalyst in promoting policies 
that are justified for a host of reasons. 
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MITIGATING SlXATEGIES FOR C02 PROBLEMS 
Lester B. Lave 
1. Introduction 
Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide have been increasing 
for more than a century due to human activities such as the clearing of 
forests and combustion of fossil fuels. [ I ]  Since the latter is forecast to 
accelerate over the foreseeable future, atmospheric concentrations wlll 
increase further. The increased carbon dioxide is predicted to warm the 
earth's c h a t e  (an increase in the annual average temperature of about 
10 degrees Celsius a t  the poles and little at  the equator), to change pre- 
cipltation patterns (probably less precipitation in the American Midwest), 
and to change ocean movements. [2] The atmospheric changes are 
unlrkely to be measureable until at  least the turn of the century and the 
effects probably will not be of substantial magnitude until well into the 
21st century. [3] 
Uncertainty over four factors complicates efforts to examine the 
implications of carbon dioxide emissions. The first factor is the amount 
of fossil fuel that will be burned each year; this depends on world popula- 
tion, economic activity, the costs and availability of each energy source, 
and technologies for utilizing energy. The second major uncertain factor 
is the interactions of the ice caps and the oceans with atmospheric car- 
bon dioxide and temperature change: how will various concentrations of 
C02 in the atmosphere affect the oceans and how fast can the oceans 
absorb C02 and heat from the atmosphere? The third factor is the 
interaction of biota with changes in the atmosphere and oceans. The 
fourth is the extent to whch human behavior and institutions can and will 
mitigate the adverse effects of the physical and biological changes or 
even utilize these changes to accomplish individual and social goals 
better. 
2. Difficulties of Prevention 
Policies designed to lessen carbon dioxide emissions are unattrac- 
tive. Foss1.1 fuels are the cheapest source of fluid and solid fuels at 
present; proscribing them would be difficult and expensive. More impor- 
tantly, the effects of increased CO in the atmosphere will be highly unc- 
ertain for at least half a century. Tt would be extremely difficult to con- 
vince any nation to bear the hgher costs associated with switching t o  
other fuels, particularly since we can neither estimate the magnitude of 
the changes with assurance nor be certain that the physical changes will 
be predominantly detrimental to humans. These difficulties of curtailing 
the use of fossil fuels are so immense that very little is likely to be done 
to abate carbon dioxide emissions before the middle of the next century; 
steps wlll be taken then only if the effects are important, predominantly 
adverse, and adaptation is unable to mitigate the costs. 
The lags associated with recognizing the problem and taking action 
are further reasons why carbon dioxide emissions are unlikely to be 
abated before the end of the 21st century. First, there is a recognition 
lag associated with obtainmg convincing proof that carbon dioxide will 
cause large, adverse effects. As early as 2000, we could receive confirma- 
tion that general circulation models (GCMs) are correctly predict~ng the 
gross climate effects. However, there will remain considerable uncer- 
tainty because the models could roughly predict the effects of small 
increases in carbon dioxide but be inaccurate on the effects of larger 
concentrations. Moreover, features of climate that are of second or t h r d  
order importance under the current climate regime could become of first 
order importance with large increases in carbon dioxide levels. Even 
greater uncertainty stems from whether a particular climatic change 
ends up producing beneficial rather than adverse outcomes. 
A second lag is that associated mth general recognition of the prob- 
lem and deciding on a solution. The perceived seriousness of the problem 
would vary with location, occupation, income, and perceived alternatives. 
For example, seven years after the abrupt change in petroleum supply 
resulting from the Arab oil embargo and quadruplmg of oil price, there is 
little agreement withn the U S  or international communities about what 
pohcies to pursue. Getting agreement on the carbon dioxide problem and 
its solution could take decades. 
One factor malclng rnternational agreement difficult is the interna- 
tional nature of the carbon dioxide problem. [4] Atmospheric conc entra- 
tion of C02 is a "public good" (or bad) in that no small nation can have a 
noticeable effect on climatic change by its individual program to abate 
carbon &oxide emissions. Furthermore, there is every incentive to 
cheat, since one nation's emissions would not have much effect on cli- 
mate if every other nation eschewed fossil fuels. Yet, clearly the total 
emission is the sum of the emissions of each nation. Finally, some 
nations stand to gain from chmatic change and would encourage fossil 
fuel burning. 
The thlrd lag is that  required to switch fuel sources once agreement 
has been reached on policies. Other fuels must be extracted and high 
investments and retraining of labor are required. Several decades would 
be required to change fuel sources. 
These lags are likely to be so long that it will be the latter part of the 
next century before carbon dioxide emissions could be curtailed substan- 
tially. Absent compelling reasons for relinquishing fossil fuels, we can be 
virtually certain that substantial climatic change wrll occur and persist. 
3. Identifying Carbon Dioxide Effects 
The effect of human activity on climatic change due to C 0 2  emissions 
is likely to be small compared to that stemming from other events. For 
the next century, wars, economic competition, usual climate fluctuations, 
and technological change probably will be more important than the long 
term climatic changes due to carbon dioxide. Carbon dioxide is likely to 
seem unimportant beside the myriad current, short-lived opportunities 
and problems. 
Nor are the consequences of climatic change easily attributed to the 
correct cause. Clunatic change might cause lifestyle changes, such as 
forc~ng a group of farmers to move into cities, whch in turn lead to 
increases in crime or civil disorder. The perceived problem would be the 
crime and violence, and it would be far from obvious that carbon dioxide 
was the culprit. Similarly, unemployment, regional strife, or even world 
war m ~ g h t  result from carbon dioxide, but it is unlikely that there would 
be general recognition of the cause. Alternatively, in regions where grow- 
ing conditions improved, the change would probably be ascribed to some 
combination of astute planning and good luck. 
Whle physical changes, such as temperature and precipitation, can 
be measured, it is more difficult to measure the direct human reactions 
to climatic change, such as new cropping patterns. Virtually impossible 
to measure would be the tertiary effects, good and bad, that  flow from 
cascading social adjustment. If social institutions are functioning well, 
the effects will be beneficial on net, but will be so diverse that they could 
not be linked to carbon dioxlde. If institutions are not functionmg well. 
effects such as urban crowd-, crime, and riots are  not lkely  to be per- 
ceived as due to carbon dioxide. Thus, it seems unlikely that society will 
be provided w t h  convincing proof that action must be taken to reduce 
carbon &oxide emissions because the cnsequences are intolerable -- at 
least not until climatic changes are very large. 
4. Methods for Adaptation 
Thus, a t  least two decades are likely to pass before the first predic- 
tions about climatic change can be verified, and much more time may 
pass before climate effects could be predicted with confidence. Unfor- 
tunately, the adverse consequences of climatic change are unlikely to be 
recognized until they are very large. Since fossil fuels will continue to be 
attractive, carbon dioxide emissions are unlikely to be abated until there 
are bad, almost disastrous consequences and only then with a consider- 
able lag. Thus, if we are to do something about this potential problem, 
the emphasis should be on adapting to climatic change; prevention is 
unhkely to succeed, since curtailing emissions would have to occur well in 
advance of consequences or even confident forecasts of consequences. 
4.1. Explicit or Conscious Adaptation 
The usual conception of adaptation focuses on actions taken by some 
institution or individual as a conscious response to a perception of a need 
for change. [ 5 ]  These explicit or conscious adaptations result from &or- 
rnation and thought; they are rational changes in behavior designed to 
mit~gate damage or take advantage of an opportunity. For explicit adap- 
tation to occur, some authoritative source must present information in 
an understandable form, convince the decision makers that  change is 
desirable and feasible, and facilitate change. 
The hallmark of conscious adaptation is legal compulsion or explicit 
recognition of a problem and the possible solution; in both cases behavior 
change results from widespread dissemination of information. The 
presentations must be such that  the problem is readily understood; dis- 
semination must ensure that information gets to decision makers and 
appears authoritative. [6] However, as the warning on cigarette packs or 
laws against marijuana indicate, inducing changes in behavior is difficult. 
The decisions to be influenced by climatic change include those con- 
cerning investments, education and training, migration and location gen- 
erally, jobs, and the production and purchase of goods and services. The 
facts that are pertinent, people to be reached, and points of leverage vary 
with each target. 
Explicit government intervention to change behavior might take the 
form of laws, or licensing and control of conditions of operation. Laws 
define property rights and tolerable behavior. Violations bring incarcera- 
tion, fines, or  other criminal and civil penalties. In the extreme, execu- 
tion or lifelong incarceration can prevent proscribed behavior. Laws are 
a direct way of changing behavior, but often are unsuccessful. Laws work 
best when there is a clearly identified action, such as murder, whch is 
abhorred. They do not work in attempting to change behavior to 
correspond to the moral beliefs of a minority, as in the case of prohibi- 
tion. Unfortunately, mitigating the problems caused by carbon dioxide is 
likely to requre  subtle changes in behavior that could not be induced by 
iaws. 
Laws can also influence behavior by zonmg, declaring areas of! limits 
to various actinties (for example, wilderness areas), or generally chang- 
mg property rights and the conditions under which business can operate. 
A forecast rise m sea level due to carbon dioxide induced warming might 
bring about rezoning to prevent new buildings from being constructed in 
areas whch would be flooded. However, current efforts to prevent con- 
struction in flood plains are notably unsuccessful. 
4.2. Mixed Explici t-Implicit Adaptations 
A range of possible government actions, such as taxes, subsidies, and 
attempts at moral suasion, do not compel changes in behavior, but do 
exert an influence. [?I These actions stem from conscious decisions by 
government but need not result in conscious decisions by consumers. 
Taxes and subsidies can provide various degrees of incentive to 
change behavior. For example, the subsidy to gasohol resulted in rapid, 
large-scale increases in production. Taxes on gasoline which caused vast 
differences in price resulted in large differences in fuel economy between 
automobiles designed for use in the U S  and those designed for use in 
most European nations in the 1960s. The difficulty is designing taxes and 
subsidies that will accomplish the intended goal. Professional advisers 
ensure that taxes and subsidies are used for many purposes other than 
those mtended. For example, Nordhaus has tentatively proposed a tax of 
%iO per ton of carbon released into the atmosphere. [8] The narrow focus 
of t h s  proposal might be compared to others such as subsidies for 
nuclear power or prohibiting synfuels. 
hcensing of workers and businesses and regulation of the conditions 
of operation are used by state and local government to accomplish such 
purposes as ensuring minunurn quality standards and regulating location. 
Implementation and enforcement of these rules is difficult and limits 
thew applicability. More importantly, there is the temptation to use 
taxes, subsidies, licenses, and so forth, to reward special groups or 
accomplish unrelated, often socially undesirable goals, such as raising 
the income of a group (for example, barbers) at the expense of the pub- 
lic. Economists have learned painfully that legislating any type of tax 
subsidy or regulation is predominantly a political process whose outcome 
d l  have little semblance of economic efficiency. Wtule these tools are 
available in theory, in practice they are used to accomplish other ends 
and are largely meffective. [9] 
The effect of moral suasion by the government should not be 
underestimated. Where it is not against the perceived self-interest of 
mdividuals, moral suasion can lead to important changes in behavior, as 
evidenced by energy or water conservation during crises. Even where the 
individual is required to make a sacrifice, most will do so i f  there is a per- 
ceived threat to society and a perception that all indimduals will share 
the burden, for example, serving in the armed forces during World War 11. 
If people could be convinced that carbon dioxide is a serious problem, 
they would probably respond to appeals to conserve energy. 
4.3. Implicit or Unconscious Adaptation 
Conscious adaptation is a blunt instrument, subject to all of the diffi- 
culties of enacting legislation or other formal rules. It is a direct way of 
compelling changes in behavior and is thus appealing. But, it is subject to 
major defects, such as speed of enacting change. More important than 
explicit adaptation is implicit or automatic adjustment. For example, 
adjustment to changes in consumer preferences for goods and services is 
done automatically via prices and profits through the market place. Nei- 
ther the government nor any national organization need recognize the 
change and prescribe action. Indeed, most shdts in tastes are accomo- 
dated without explicit recognibon. If fossil fuels became more expensive, 
due for example to a tax on carbon emitted into the atmosphere, 
businesses and consumers would be led to an automatic sb f t  toward 
other energy sources. 
Ths  is not to imply that national recognition of a change would not 
take place or would not serve to expedite adjustment and lower social 
costs. Current government activity to estimate the effects of carbon 
dioxide could inform business and consumers, thereby helping them to 
adjust. However, data collection and analysis, recognition of changes, and 
dissemination of the information are profitable nongovernmental activi- 
ties, since they can increase profit opportunities and reduce loss. A 
number of large US companies, including survey and consulting firms, 
now specialize in collection of data or rnalnng economic forecasts. Whle 
some information collection and dissemination is a public good with a role 
for govermnent, the vast proportion takes place privately. 
Early recognition of changes in consumer tastes, climatic conditions, 
or production opportunities has vast implications for profits. For indivi- 
duals and organizations that have no capacity to gather and analyze data 
on carbon dioxide induced c h a t i c  change, the market provides unmis- 
takeable signals in the form of crop failure, unemployment, bankruptcy, 
or more subtly in lower wages and profits for some businesses contrasted 
with profit increases and hghe r  wages for others. Firms making windfall 
profits grow and are imitated. Thus, business and workers are  led, as if 
by an "invisible hand," to adjust to the changing market. 
The social structure also promotes adaptive behavior. For example, 
age a t  marriage and number of chldren are influenced significantly by 
social norms. Similarly, job choice, geographcal location, time in the 
labor force, and food preferences are affected by social institutions. 
Social pressures speeded the diffusion of television m the 1940s and could 
speed the demise of large cars in the 1980s; they affect family size, total 
population, total economic activity, and consumption patterns, thus 
inhrectly affecting C 0 2  emission rates and adaptation to climatic change. 
Unconscious adaptation translates subtle cues into individual and 
sociai change. It is purposive in reduc~ng dissonance between the indivi- 
dual and his environment, either by exploiting new opportunities or cut- 
Ling losses. Whether lt is helpful for a community, nation, or  the world 
depends on the aggregation of individual actions. The institutional and 
technological structure of society determines whether individuals acting 
in their self-interest speed or impede needed social adjustment. The 
economic model of perfect competition is one institutional framework 
where individual nations are  perfectly consonant with social objectives. 
Whie there is no doubt of the power of social institutions in influenc- 
ing behavior, there is vast uncertainty associated with how climatic 
changes would affect social institutions, thereby affecting behavior. We 
know almost nothlng about how governments could manipulate social 
institutions so as to facilitate adaptive behavior toward climatic change. 
Presumably government could influence the media and opinion leaders as 
a neans of mfluencing social institutions generally. 
There should be planned dissemination of results as the carbon diox- 
ide research proceeds, particularly careful education of reporters and 
environmental and other interest groups. However, care must be taken 
not to waste goodwffl and credbility by dissemination of material that  
does not have new results or of material so speculative as to have a large 
chance of be~ng wrong. 
5. Enhancing the Capacity to Adapt 
Carbon dioxide induced environmental changes may require changes 
m location of businesses, residences, and such social overhead capital as 
streets and sewers. Large amounts of plant and equipment must be 
replaced, workers may have to find new jobs, often in new locations and 
involmng new skills. Firms may have to redesign their products and 
manufactur~ng processes. Furthermore, these changes vnll be in addition 
to changes due to shf t s  in taste, technological change, changing availabil- 
ities of raw materials, changing patterns of international trade and rela- 
tions, and vast "normal" variation in c h a t e .  The abllity to adapt to the 
carbon dioxide induced changes will be determined by the ability to adapt 
to the other changes. 
Will the automatic mechanisms send the proper signals? Will govern- 
ment and other decision makers perceive the problem and implement 
policies that will expedite adaptation? If people perceive the need to 
change their behavior, will they have the resources and knowledge to 
change? Will the social and economic institutions be able to keep pace 
with climatic and social change? 
Whether society will have the required resources to adapt will be 
measured by several in&ces. The first is gross national product (or 
income) per capita. Ths  is a measure of aggregate economic activity and 
is a surrogate for the economic resources to bu ld  new facilities or move 
people. [ lo] 
The second is the gross rate of investment or ratio of investment to 
GNP. A h g h  ratio means that  the.economy is putting many new facilities 
into place and turning over its capital stock rapidly. Since new plant and 
equipment can be designed for the new situations and be built in the right 
places, rapid turnover means that most of the capital stock can be 
tailored to the new regime. For example, consider an economy in whlch 
capital lasts 50 years, and so only 2 percent of capital is replaced each 
year. Climatic change could make much of the capital obsolete, but the 
obsolete capital would remam for a long time. In contrast, consider an 
economy that turns over its capital stock every decade. As changes are 
perceived, they could be incorporated into new capital so that little plant 
and equipment would ever be obsolete. 
A t h r d  measure of the capacity of the economy to adapt will be the 
general education level of workers. Educated workers find it easier to  
acquire the new skllls required for jobs. [ ? I ]  A skilled labor force can 
redesign products and facilities to respond to new conditions. 
For three other characteristics facilitating adaptation, there are no 
simple measures. One such characteristic is the flexibility and diversity 
of capital stock. Some plant and equipment is so hghly specialized that  
minor changes in raw materials, product design, or fuels are impossible 
to accomodate. For example, some oil refineries were bullt to  process 
only one type of crude oil snd produce a fixed set  of outputs. Another 
example is an electricity generation urut that can be designed to burn 
natural gas, oil, coal, any two, or all three fuels. The greater the flexlbil- 
ity, the less need to replace the capital and the easier will be adjustment. 
Diversity of the capital stock gives the economy the resiliency t o  avoid 
disaster in the face of changing conditions such as climate. An analogy is 
planting a number of varieties of some grain, rather than depending on a 
monoculture. The monculture can give greater yield under a narrow 
range of conditions but can lead to crop failure if conditions change. 
Similarly, building flexible, diverse capital (like a boiler that can use 
three fuels) increases cost or lowers output (like planting many varieties 
of grain), but offers insurance against changing conditions. Another 
example is the inventories, such as grain and oil, held; large inventories 
are costly but provide a tool for mitigating the effects of climatic and 
other changes. 
A second difficult to measure characteristic is the amount of basic 
scientific knowledge and the number of technological alternatives 
currently available or that can be developed quickly. The greater 1s 
scientific knowledge, the more opportunity exists to design technology 
appropnate to the new conditions. The greater the variety of currently 
available technology, the greater the chance that some "on the shelf" 
technology will fit the new conditions. For example, agronomists might 
be set to work immehately breedmg plant and animal strains suited to 
hotter dry or wet climates. 
A final chzracteristic is the capacity of individuals to interpret the 
signals of changing conditions correctly and to adapt t o  them quickly. A 
better educated population and good planning organizations in social 
institutions will help. The ability and willingness of planners to recognize 
the signals and interpret them for the population and social institutions 
that lack t h s  ability is important. Ths  includes collection of the right 
data so as to recognize change early and to identify its cause. The federal 
government has an obligation and important role in collecting and analyz- 
i r i  data and disseminating the interpretations. 
6. Conclusions 
Society can take steps to enhance each of these characteristics of 
our ability to adapt more easily to carbon &oxide induced changes. 
Given the rapidity of social md technological change in the 20th century, 
facilitating adjustment is important. With the exception of data collection 
and anaiysis focused on climate, enhancing each of these functions will be 
to the general benefit of society, but will not be unique to carbon dioxide 
rnduced problems. Carbon dioxide issues can provide a rationale, but 
probably will be more a catalyst, for pushng society to enhance its ability 
to adapt to and exploit change. Carbon dioxide is but one of many factors 
which will have an enormous impact on the economy and social institu- 
tions of the US and other countries in the 21st century. If carbon dioxide 
induced changes were as large as now appears possible, and i f  they were 
the only major changes, then it would be worthwhde to invest in enhanc- 
ing education and capital formation so that we could minimize the effects 
of adverse changes and take advantage of beneficial changes. Since car- 
bon dioxide induced changes are likely to be only one, possibly small, 
source of change, there is all the more reason to devote resources to 
making our economc and social institutions more flexible and adaptable. 
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